Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes

• María Gómez-Rúa ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidade de Vigo

     Universidade de Vigo

     Vigo, España

     
• Localización: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, ISSN 1869-4195, Vol. 4, Nº. 2, 2013, págs. 137-153
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost.We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents.We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem.