Teamwork and moral hazard: : Evidence from the emergency department

• Autores: David C. Chan
• Localización: Journal of Political Economy, ISSN-e 1537-534X, Vol. 124, Nº. 3, 2016, págs. 734-770
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • I investigate how teamwork may reduce moral hazard by joint monitoring and management. I study two organizational systems differing in the extent to which physicians may mutually manage work: Physicians are assigned patients in a “nurse-managed” system but divide patients between themselves in a “self-managed” system. The self-managed system increases throughput productivity by reducing a “foot-dragging” moral hazard, in which physicians prolong patient stays as expected future work increases. I find evidence that physicians in the same location have better information about each other and that, in the self-managed system, they use this information to assign patients.