S5 for Aristotelian actualists

• Autores: Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin, Michael Nelson
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 173, Nº. 6, 2016, págs. 1537-1569
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Aristotelian Actualism is the conjunction of the theses that absolutely everything is actual, that individuals are neither reducible to nor dependent on independently identified properties, and that some individuals are genuine contingent existents. Robert Adams and Gregory Fitch, two prominent proponents of Aristotelian Actualism, have argued that this view has a consequence that any modal logic stronger than M, and so any modal logic in which symmetry and reflexivity are frame conditions, is inadequate. We argue that this is incorrect.