Matters of ambiguity: : faultless disagreement, relativism and realism

• Autores: John Eriksson, Marco Tiozzo
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 173, Nº. 6, 2016, págs. 1517-1536
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In some cases of disagreement it seems that neither party is at fault or making a mistake. This phenomenon, so-called faultless disagreement, has recently been invoked as a key motivation for relativist treatments of domains prone to such disagreements. The conceivability of faultless disagreement therefore appears incompatible with traditional realists semantics. This paper examines recent attempts to accommodate faultless disagreement without giving up on realism. We argue that the accommodation is unsatisfactory. However, the examination highlights that “faultless” is multiply ambiguous. The more overarching purpose is to examine the consequences of this—more generally, how to think about faultless disagreement.