Rebutting and undercutting in mathematics

• Autores: Kenny Easwaran
• Localización: Philosophical Perspectives, ISSN-e 1520-8583, Vol. 29, Nº. 1, 2015, págs. 146-162
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • View Full Article (HTML) Enhanced Article (HTML) Get PDF (374K) In my (2009) I argued that a central component of mathematical practice is that published proofs must be “transferable” — that is, they must be such that the author's reasons for believing the conclusion are shared directly with the reader, rather than requiring the reader to essentially rely on testimony. The goal of this paper is to explain this requirement of transferability in terms of a more general norm on defeat in mathematical reasoning that I will call “convertibility”. I begin by discussing two types of epistemic defeat: “rebutting” and “undercutting”. I give examples of both of these kinds of defeat from the history of mathematics. I then argue that an important requirement in mathematics is that published proofs be detailed enough to allow the conversion of rebutting defeat into undercutting defeat. Finally, I show how this sort of convertibility explains the requirement of transferability, and contributes to the way mathematics develops by the pattern referred to by Lakatos (1976) as “lemma incorporation”.