Does the Executive Dominate the Westminster Legislative Process?: Six Reasons for Doubt

• Meg Russell ^[1] ; Daniel Gover ; Kristina Wolter
  1. [1] University College London

     University College London

     Reino Unido

     
• Localización: Parliamentary affairs: A journal of representative politics, ISSN 0031-2290, Vol. 69, Nº 2, 2016, págs. 286-308
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • The British Westminster parliament is frequently dismissed as a weak policy actor, in the face of dominant executive power. But through analysis of 4361 amendments to 12 government bills, and over 120 interviews, we suggest six reasons for doubting the orthodox view. These fall into three groups: overstating government success in making amendments, overstating non-government failure, and overlooking parliamentary influence before and after the formal passage of bills. We demonstrate that Westminster in fact has substantial influence in the policy process, not readily visible through commonly published data. Uncovering influence requires careful tracking of amendments, but also qualitative analysis of actors' motivations and the power of ‘anticipated reactions’. Because Westminster is often seen as being at the weak end of a comparative spectrum of parliamentary influence, these results are important for demonstrating both the dynamics of British politics, and of parliamentary systems more broadly.