The Faces of Judicial Independence: Democratic versus Bureaucratic Accountability in Judicial Selection, Training, and Promotion in South Korea and Taiwan

• Autores: Neil Chisholm
• Localización: American journal of comparative law, ISSN 0002-919X, Nº. 4, 2014, págs. 893-950
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This Article examines parallel judicial independence-related institutional arrangements and controversies in South Korea and Taiwan and, based on these, theorizes that there exists a sharp philosophical bifurcation between judicial independence regimes that make judges either bureaucratically or democratically accountable. After uncovering the Germanic origins of the two jurisdictions' judicial selection, training, and promotion methods and showing how these arrangements have functioned, this study explains how these have recently been reformed in ways that represent the adoption of Americanstyle judicial independence logic. To properly understand these transformations, the Article further develops Mirjan Damaska's theory of the dichotomous styles, or "faces," of judicial independence to illustrate the existence of two different logical approaches to securing judicial independence and to analyze how they are being mixed in Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere.