Embedded counterfactuals and possible worlds semantics

• Autores: Charles B. Cross
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 173, Nº. 3, 2016, págs. 665-673
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • Stephen Barker argues that a possible worlds semantics for the counterfactual conditional of the sort proposed by Stalnaker and Lewis cannot accommodate certain examples in which determinism is true and a counterfactual Q > R is false, but where, for some P, the compound counterfactual P > (Q > R) is true. I argue that the completeness theorem for Lewis’s system VC of counterfactual logic shows that Stalnaker–Lewis semantics does accommodate Barker’s example, and I argue that its doing so should be understood as showing that the example is an exception to Lewis’s Time’s Arrow requirements.