McGee on Horwich

• Autores: Ryan Christensen
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 193, Nº. 1, 2016, págs. 205-218
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Vann McGee has argued against solutions to the liar paradox that simply restrict the scope of the T sentences as little as possible. This argument is often taken to disprove Paul Horwich’s preferred solution to the liar paradox for his Minimal Theory of truth (MT). I argue that Horwich’s theory is different enough from the theory McGee criticized that these criticisms do not apply to Horwich’s theory. On the basis of this, I argue that propositional theories, like MT, cannot be evaluated using the same methods as sentential theories.