Rationalizability and efficiency in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly

• Autores: Gabriel Desgranges, Stéphanie Gauthier
• Localización: International journal of industrial organization, ISSN 0167-7187, Vol. 44, Nº. 0, 2016, págs. 163-176
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper studies rationalizability in a linear asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with a unique Nash equilibrium. It shows that mergers favor uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome. When one requires uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome maximization of consumers' surplus may involve a symmetric oligopoly with few firms. We interpret uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome as favoring a dampening of strategic ‘coordination’ uncertainty. An illustration to the merger between Delta Air Lines and Northwest shows that a reallocation of 1% of market share from a small carrier to a larger one has implied a lower production volatility over time, yielding a 1.5% decrease in the coefficient of variation of number of passengers.