Why there isn’t inter-level causation in mechanisms

• Autores: Felipe Romero
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 192, Nº. 11, 2015, págs. 3731-3755
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The experimental interventions that provide evidence of causal relations are notably similar to those that provide evidence of constitutive relevance relations. In the first two sections, I show that this similarity creates a tension: there is an inconsistent triad between (1) Woodward’s popular interventionist theory of causation, (2) Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, and a variety of arguments for (3) the incoherence of inter-level causation. I argue for an interpretation of the views in which the tension is merely apparent. I propose to explain inter-level relations without inter-level causation by appealing to the notion of fat-handed interventions, and an argument against inter-level causation which dissolves the problem.