Epistemic charge

• Autores: Susanna Siegel
• Localización: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN-e 1467-9264, Vol. 115, Nº. 3, 2015, pág. 277306
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • It is often assumed that while beliefs redound on the rational standing of a subject, perceptions do not. An irrational belief detracts from the rationality of believers, according to this assumption, but perceptions cannot do the same. I argue that perceptual experiences can have a rational standing, and that their epistemic status can be modulated by other psychological states (such as fears, wishes, prior knowledge and belief) that help produce them. Drawing on a metaphor from electricity, I call the epistemic status that perceptual experiences can have ‘epistemic charge'.