Resumen de Investor heterogeneity and asymmetric volatility under short-sale constraints: Evidence from Korean fund market
- español
Este trabajo investiga dos cuestiones: si acaso existe heterogeneidad para los administradores de fondos como inversionistas y si la volatilidad que enfrentan es asimétrica bajo restricciones de ventas cortas. Bajo restricciones de ventas cortos, se testea la hipótesis de diferencia de opiniones de Chen, Hong y Stein (2001) y Hong y Stein (2003). Los resultados son consistentes con el modelo de Hong y Stein (2003), que predice que la existencia de asimetrías negativas tiene mayor probabilidad de ocurrencia mientras mayores sean las diferencias de opinión entre los administradores de fondos. Así entonces, nuestros resultados implican que el efecto de sobrevaloración es más destacado en fondos en que existe una mayor dispersión de las opiniones de los administradores de fondos. Estos resultados son consistentes con la intuición de Miller (1977) y el modelo de Hong y Stein (2003). Además, nuestros resultados también apoyan la hipótesis de burbuja estocástica y son consistentes con Blanchard y Watson (1982) y Wu (1997), incluso después de controlar por las características de los fondos.
- English
We analyze the asymmetric behavior of fund managers with short-selling constraints under different market conditions to confirm the hypothesis of difference of opinion of fund managers and also investigate determinants in difference of opinions in fund market. This paper examines two issues: whether there exists the difference of opinions of fund managers and whether there is asymmetric volatility under short-sale constraints. Under short-sale constraints, we implement testing the hypothesis of difference of opinion found by Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Hong and Stein (2003). This hypothesis provides a unique opportunity to test directly the differences of opinion among fund managers that operate under short-sale constraints using asset-allocating strategies. The test results provide evidence that there is asymmetric volatility and increased differences of opinion among fund managers. Furthermore, the results of this study are consistent with the model of Hong and Stein (2003), which predicts that negative asymmetries are more likely to occur when there are large differences of opinions among fund managers. Therefore, our results imply that the overvaluation effect is more remarkable in funds for which a wider dispersion of the opinions of fund managers exists. These findings are consistent with Miller’s (1977) intuition and Hong and Stein’s (2003) model. In addition, our results also support the stochastic bubble hypothesis and are consistent with Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Wu (1997), even after controlling for fund characteristic variables.
