Non-Representational Mathematical Realism

• Frapolli, Maria Jose ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Granada (Spain) University College (UK)
• Localización: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science, ISSN 0495-4548, Vol. 30, Nº 3, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: History and Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics), págs. 331-348
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphysical inflationism derived from some versions of mathematical realism do not force them to embrace non-standard, epistemic approaches to truth and existence. It is also an attempt to convince mathematical realists that they do not need to implement their perfectly sound and judicious intuitions with the anti-intuitive developments that render full-blown mathematical realism into a view which even Gödel considered objectionable (Gödel 1995, p. 150).I will argue for the following two theses: (i) that realism, in its standard characterization, is our default position, a position in agreement with our pre-theoretical intuitions and with the results of our best semantic theories, and (ii) that most of the metaphysical qualms usually related to it depends on a poor understanding of truth and existence as higher-order concepts.