Evidence of evidence is evidence (trivially)

• Autores: Juan Comesaña, Eyal Tal
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 75, Nº. 4, 2015, págs. 557-559
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Richard Feldman (2007, 2011) has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson (2012) has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman (2014) replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s principle is trivially true