Indução, confiabilidade e predicados do tipo verdul

• Marques Segundo, Luiz Helvécio ^[1]
  1. [1] UFSC
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 19, Nº. 1, 2015, págs. 33-47
• Idioma: portugués
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p33Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.