The Cogito: Indubitability without Knowledge?

• Hetherington, Stephen ^[1]
  1. [1] University of New South Wales
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 13, Nº. 1, 2009, págs. 85-92
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • How should we understand both the nature, and the epistemic potential, of Descartes’s Cogito? Peter Slezak’s interpretation of the Cogito’s nature sees it strictly as a selfreferential kind of denial: Descartes cannot doubt that he is doubting. And what epistemic implications flow from this interpretation of the Cogito? We find that there is a consequent lack of knowledge being described by Descartes: on Cartesian grounds, indubitability is incompatible with knowing. Even as the Cogito halts doubt, therefore, it fails to be knowledge.