The Elusive Nature of Truth

• Lynch, Michael ^[1]
  1. [1] Connecticut College

     Connecticut College

     Town of New London, Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 4, Nº. 2, 2000, págs. 229-256
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • In this essay, I present a new argument for the imposszbility of defining truth by specifying the underlying structural property all and only true propositions have in common. The set of considerations. I use to support this claim take as their inspiration Alston's recent argument that it is impossible to define truth epistemically—in terms of justification or warrant. According to what Alston calls the "intensional argument", epistemic definitions are inconsistent with the T-schema or the principle that it is true that p if, and only if, p. Since the T-schema has great intuitive appeal, this is a powerful indictment of epistemic theories. But the basic argument that Alston employs, and the constellation of considerations which prosecute that argument, work against a much broader range of views than he considers. While this implies that a traditional conceptual analysis of truth rnay be impossible, it opens the door to a pluralist approach to truth.