In this paper I consider two related threats to the idea that our beliefs compose a genuine worldview the global skeptic challenge to the clam that our beliefs are somehow grounded and the suspicion that our beliefs have no relation to the world whatsoever I consider these two threats from the point of view of our activity of doubting m order to establish what follows from our capacity to doubt any claim although not at once I argue that the two threats can be dispelled if we attend to a careful consideration of what is involved in doubting Once these threats are dismissed we find ourselves in a Position that enables us to critique both a naturalist conception of our worldviews and the conception of reasons that has been recommended by Brandom.
In this paper I consider two related threats to the idea that our beliefs compose a germine worldview the global skeptic challenge to the clam that our beliefs are somehow grounded and the suspicion that our beliefs have no relation to the world whatsoever I consider these two threats from the point of view of aur activity of doubting in order to establish what follows from our capacity to doubt any claim although not all at once I argue that the two threats can be dispelled if we attend to a careful consideration of what is involved in doubtmg Once these threats are disrnissed we find ourselves in a position that enables us to critique both a naturalist conception of our worldviews and the conception of reasons that has been recommended by Brandom.
© 2001-2024 Fundación Dialnet · Todos los derechos reservados