Induction and Natural Kinds

Sankey, Howard ^[1]
1. [1] University of Melbourne
  
  University of Melbourne
  
  Australia
Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 1, Nº. 2, 1997, págs. 239-254
Idioma: portugués
Enlaces
- Texto completo (pdf)

Resumen
- The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principie of the uniformity of nature More speafically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of things, which are characterized as such by the essential properties which all members of a kind necessarily possess in common. The proposed response to inductive scepticism combines the insights of epistemic naturalism with a metaphysical outlook that is due to scientific realism.