“Let’s J!”: : on the practical character of shared agency

• Autores: Tamar Schapiro
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 172, Nº. 12, 2015, págs. 3399-3407
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Drawing on parallels in Hutcheson and Hume, I raise two worries about Bratman’s theory of shared agency. First, has Bratman captured the interpersonal character of shared agency? Second, has he captured its practical character? By “its practical character,” I mean the sense in which shared agency is something we can undertake under that description, and not just a condition we might happen to find ourselves in? I argue that Bratman’s theory falls short of answering this second worry. The source of the shortcoming, I argue, is a fundamental methodological commitment that structures his action theory as a whole. This is the commitment to regard the concepts of action and shared action as empirical concepts, rather than as practical concepts