Ignorance, presuppositions, and the simple view

• Autores: Michael Blome-Tillmann
• Localización: Mind, ISSN-e 1460-2113, Vol. 124, Nº. 496, 2015, págs. 1221-1230
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa has presented a series of examples that are meant to spell trouble for Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism (PEC). In this short article I aim to establish two things. First, I argue that even if Ichikawa’s examples were viable counterexamples to PEC, they would not threaten the key ideas underlying the account in my 2009 article ‘Knowledge and Presuppositions’. The philosophically interesting work that is done in that article remains unaffected by Ichikawa’s alleged counterexamples. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the examples are not in fact successful counterexamples to PEC. The data emerging from Ichikawa’s examples can be accounted for within the framework of PEC