Hume and the Independent Witnesses

• Autores: Arif Ahmed
• Localización: Mind, ISSN-e 1460-2113, Vol. 124, Nº. 496, 2015, págs. 1013-1044
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The Humean argument concerning miracles says that one should always think it more likely that anyone who testifies to a miracle is lying or deluded than that the alleged miracle actually occurred, and so should always reject any single report of it. A longstanding and widely accepted objection is that even if this is right, the concurring and non-collusive testimony of many witnesses should make it rational to believe in whatever miracle they all report. I argue that on the contrary, even multiple reports from non-collusive witnesses lack the sort of independence that could make trouble for Hume