Just-in-time patents and the development of standards

• Autores: Byeongwoo Kang, Rudi Bekkers
• Localización: Research Policy, ISSN-e 1873-7625, Vol. 44, Nº. 10, 2015, págs. 1948-1961
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Modern technical standards often include large numbers of patented technologies that are required to implement those standards. These “standard-essential patents” are very valuable assets, and firms that do not own such patents are prepared to spend billions of dollars purchasing them. Whereas large numbers of standard-essential patents are often taken for granted, this study focuses on the process by which companies obtain such patents. Analyzing original data of a large standardization process, we demonstrate how many companies use a strategy we call “just-in-time patenting”: They apply for patents of low technical merit just before a standardization meeting, and then send the patents’ inventors to the meeting to negotiate this patented technology into the standard. Our findings have several implications for standard-setting organizations, patent offices, and policymakers, as the inclusion of just-in-time patents may reduce competition and market entry, increase prices, and unnecessarily complicate the technological content of standards