Non - optimal mechanism design

• Autores: Jason D. Hartline, Lucier Brendan
• Localización: American economic review, ISSN 0002-8282, Vol. 105, Nº 10, 2015, págs. 3102-3124
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The optimal allocation of resources in complex environments�like allocation of dynamic wireless spectrum, cloud computing services, and Internet advertising�is computationally challenging even given the true preferences of the participants. In the theory and practice of optimization in complex environments, a wide variety of special and general purpose algorithms have been developed; these algorithms produce outcomes that are satisfactory but not generally optimal or incentive compatible. This paper develops a very simple approach for converting any, potentially non-optimal, algorithm for optimization given the true participant preferences, into a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism that weakly improves social welfare and revenue. (JEL D82, H82, L82)