In any legal system there are silences, things the system does not seem to regulate, matters as to which it seems not to speak. This is also, perhaps particularly, true of the international legal system. Drawing on the Kosovo case, the attempt is made to develop a typology of the most common approaches to silence in international law. The article analyses what these approaches have to say about the issue of silence and the range of possible responses to it. Throughout, it makes explicit many of the assumptions that underpin these approaches and explores their potential implications for the character and structure of the international legal system, including in particular the basis of obligation and the role of non-state actors. It is suggested that, rather than being an esoteric or marginal issue, silence and how we respond to it goes to the very heart of our understanding of the international legal system today.
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