Resumen de Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation

Andrés Cendales, John James Mora

• español

  Se demuestra que una democracia precaria, en el nivel local, perjudica a los pobres antes que favorecerlos siempre que el partido en el gobierno, como una organización altamente informal, albergue a carteles de patrones políticos y empresarios. El alcalde no tiene la capacidad de gobernar libremente respecto a los controles o vetos ejercidos por esos actores colectivos, a los cuales pertenece, y que, al no haber sido elegidos democráticamente, tienen como objetivo cooptar el Estado en el nivel subnacional mediante la violación de derechos y libertades civiles, en jornadas electorales y delitos contra la administración pública durante el periodo que gobierna.

• English

  This paper demonstrates that a precarious democracy is harmful to the poor rather than benefiting them as long as the governing party, being a highly informal organization, includes a cartel of political patrons and business people. The mayor is unable to govern freely due to controls or vetoes exercised by those collective actors to which he/she belongs. Not having been elected democratically, the objective of these groups is to co-opt the state at the subnational level by violating civil rights and liberties on election days and committing crimes against the public administration during the term of government