This paper presents a statistical analysis with panel data of the determining factors in the provincial funds distribution to town councils in two provinces governed by the Justicialist Party (PJ) -Buenos Aires and Cordoba- between 2002 and 2007. In a nutshell, regression results show that in the subnational level the PJ has strategically assigned resources with the purpose of building electoral support and strengthening local party machines. Nevertheless, the strategy of provincial funds assignment implemented by the PJ varies according to the political and institutional context of the province. While in Buenos Aires the core districts were privileged, in Cordoba the swing districts have been the most benefited. Contrary to previous findings regarding the national level, the empirical results suggest that in the provincial level the assignment of resources does not respond to the construction of legislative support. Also, these results challenge the assumption that the issuer modifies his strategy of transfer distribution according to the level of discretion that the resources represent for the recipient.
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