Ex ante severance agreements and earnings management

• Autores: Kareen E. Brown
• Localización: Contemporary Accounting Research, ISSN-e 1911-3846, Vol. 32, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 897-940
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This research studies whether severance agreements may reduce fraudulent earnings management, and whether severance pay mitigates executives’ career concerns. In a sample of large U.S. firms, those with higher severance pay are less likely to be subject to accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Among S&P 500 firms in the post-SOX period with premanaged earnings below analyst forecasts, firms with higher severance pay are less likely to meet/beat the analyst forecast using abnormal accruals. Overall, these results suggest that fear of losing a lucrative severance package, and/or the insurance offered by such a package curbs earnings management