El problema del cerebro, la mente y la conciencia desde una perspectiva neurocientífica
- Autores: María José Codina Felip
- Localización: XX Congrés Valencià de Filosofia: Benimodo, Casa de la Cultura. 10, 11 y 12 de abril de 2014 / coord. por Tobies Grimaltos, Pablo Rychter, Pablo Andrés Aguayo Westwood, 2014, ISBN 978-84-697-0778-4, págs. 276-284
- Idioma: español
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Resumen
With the advance of neuroscience, the debate between dualism and monism has been reopened from a new perspective. The first neuroscientific studies begin to outline the idea that all human behavior , including the phenomenon of consciousness and freedom, will be able to explain from a biological perspective. Neuroscientist reductionist monism says that all mental process can be explained in brain terms. Other authors defend the mind-brain dualism, understanding that they are two separate entities. Facing these positions, others authors such as Mittelstrass, advocate pragmatic dualism: although there is no strong bases to defend the distinction between physical and mental states and processes, psychological theoretical concepts should not be dismissed, because they are useful for its explanatory value . In this context , the task of philosophy is to produce clarity in all areas of our self , including the scientific aspect of it.
