Resumen de Assessing the impact of port charges on ocean carriers' choice of vessel size, service routes, and service frequency
Because seaports handle a vast majority of international trade, their efficiency and use can dictate the prosperity and growth of the global economy. Given their increased strategic roles in the global economy, many port authorities wanted to develop wise port investment plans for continually improving or expanding the port infrastructure. Such plans often begin with the assurance of needed port finances through strategic port pricing. One critical element of strategic port pricing includes an optimal determination of port charges, which, in turn, may influence the ocean carrier’s shipping behavior including the choice of vessel size, shipping service routes, and shipping frequency. Considering the aforementioned interdynamics among port efficiency, port finance, and ocean carriers’ port selection decisions, this article proposes a mathematical model based on non-cooperative game theory that helps port authorities and terminal operating companies develop the most desirable port charging policy. To validate the rigor and usefulness of the proposed game-theoretic model, we applied it to solve actual port charge problems encountered by three competing seaports in Korea
