Transparency in the financial system: : Rollover risk and crises

• Autores: Matthieu Bouvard, Pierre Chaigneau, Adolfo de Motta
• Localización: The Journal of finance, ISSN 0022-1082, Vol. 70, Nº 4, 2015, págs. 1805-1837
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bank-specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency during crises. Under this policy, however, information disclosure signals a deterioration of economic fundamentals, which gives the regulator ex post incentives to withhold information. This commitment problem precludes a disclosure policy that provides ex ante optimal insurance against aggregate shocks, and can result in excess opacity that increases the likelihood of a systemic crisis