The value of truth: : a reply to Howson

• Autores: James M. Joyce
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 75, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 413-424
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Colin Howson has recently argued that accuracy arguments for probabilism fail because they assume a privileged ‘coding’ in which TRUE is assigned the value 1 and FALSE is assigned the value 0. I explain why this is wrong by first showing that Howson’s objections are based on a misconception about the way in which degrees of confidence are measured, and then reformulating the accuracy argument in a way that manifestly does not depend on the coding of truth-values. Along the way, I will explain how to formulate the laws of probability and rational expectation in a scale-invariant way, and how to properly understand the values of the credence functions that we use to represent rational degrees of confidence