Epistemicism, paradox, and conditional obligation

• Autores: Ivan Hu
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 172, Nº. 8, 2015, págs. 2123-2139
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Stewart Shapiro has objected to the epistemicist theory of vagueness on grounds that it gives counterintuitive predictions about cases involving conditional obligation. This paper details a response on the epistemicist’s behalf. I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the objection is unsuccessful as an argument against epistemicism. I then reconstruct and offer two alternative arguments inspired by Shapiro’s considerations, and argue that these fail too, given the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligations