The idols of inner-sense

• Autores: Chad Kidd
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 172, Nº. 7, 2015, págs. 1759-1782
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Many philosophers hold one of two extreme views about our capacity to have phenomenally conscious experience (“inner-sense”): either (i) that inner-sense enables us to know our experience and its properties infallibly or (ii) the contrary conviction that inner-sense is utterly fallible and the evidence it provides completely defeasible. Both of these are in error. This paper presents an alternative conception of inner-sense, modeled on disjunctive conceptions of perceptual awareness, that avoids both erroneous extremes, but that builds on the commonsense intuitions that motivate them