I—Moral testimony, moral virtue, and the value of autonomy

• Autores: Hallvard Lillehammer
• Localización: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, ISSN-e 1467-8349, Vol. 88, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 111-127
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one's moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What's the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or political as an epistemological question. Its answer is as much a matter of contingent empirical fact as a matter of a priori necessity. In the background is a mixture of normative and descriptive issues, including the value of autonomy, the nature of legitimate authority, and who to trust.