Reasons for belief, perception, and reflective knowledge

• Autores: Alan Millar
• Localización: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, ISSN-e 1467-8349, Vol. 88, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 1-19
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • A conception of the relation between reasons for belief, justified belief, and knowledge is outlined on which (1) a belief is justified, in the sense of being well-founded, only if there is an adequate (normative) reason to believe it, (2) (normative) reasons to believe something are constituted by truths, and (3) a reason to believe something justifies one in believing it only if it is constituted by a truth or truths that one knows. It is argued that, contrary to initial appearances, perceptual justification does not pose a problem for this view. The discussion touches upon the relation between believing for reasons and reflective knowledge