Pretense and fiction-directed thought

• Autores: Michael R. Hicks
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 172, Nº. 6, 2015, págs. 1549-1573
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Thought about fictional characters is special, and needs to be distinguished from ordinary world-directed thought. On my interpretation, Kendall Walton and Gareth Evans have tried to show how this serious fiction-directed thought can arise from engagement with a kind of pretending. Many criticisms of their account have focused on the methodological presupposition, that fiction-directed thought is the appropriate explanandum. In the first part of this paper, I defend the methodological claim, and thus the existence of the problem to which pretense is supposed to be a solution. In the second part, I elaborate and defend the pretense theory as a solution to this problem.