Political pressures and the evolution of disclosure regulation

• Autores: Jeremy Bertomeu, Robert P. Magee
• Localización: Review of Accounting Studies, ISSN-e 1573-7136, Vol. 20, Nº. 2, 2015, págs. 775-802
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper examines the process that drives the formation and evolution of disclosure regulations. In equilibrium, changes in the regulation depend on the status quo, standard-setters’ political accountability and underlying objectives, and the cost and benefits of disclosure to reporting entities. Excessive political accountability need not implement the regulation preferred by diversified investors. Political pressures slow standard-setting and, if the standard-setter prefers high levels of disclosure, induce regulatory cycles characterized by long phases of increasing disclosure requirements followed by a sudden deregulation.