Some epistemological ramifications of the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox

• Autores: Michael Rescorla
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 192, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 735-767
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper discusses conditional probability TeX, or the probability of A given B. When TeX, the ratio formula determines TeX. When TeX, the ratio formula breaks down. The Borel–Kolmogorov paradox suggests that conditional probabilities in such cases are indeterminate or ill-posed. To analyze the paradox, I explore the relation between probability and intensionality. I argue that the paradox is a Frege case, similar to those that arise in many probabilistic and non-probabilistic contexts. The paradox vividly illustrates how an agent’s way of representing an entity can rationally influence her credal assignments. I deploy my analysis to defend Kolmogorov’s relativistic treatment of conditional probability.