Dualist mental causation and the exclusion problem

• Autores: Thomas Kroedel
• Localización: Noûs, ISSN-e 1468-0068, Vol. 49, Nº. 2, 2015, págs. 357-375
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The paper argues that dualism can explain mental causation and solve the exclusion problem. If dualism is combined with the assumption that the psychophysical laws have a special status, it follows that some physical events counterfactually depend on, and are therefore caused by, mental events. Proponents of this account of mental causation can solve the exclusion problem in either of two ways: they can deny that it follows that the physical effect of a mental event is overdetermined by its mental and physical causes, or they can accept that the physical effect is overdetermined but claim that this is unproblematic because the case is sufficiently dissimilar to prototypical cases of overdetermination.