A new unified account of truth and paradox

• Autores: Neil Tennant
• Localización: Mind, ISSN-e 1460-2113, Vol. 124, Nº. 494, 2015, págs. 571-605
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • I propose an anti-realist account of truth and paradox according to which the logico-semantic paradoxes are not genuine inconsistencies. The �global� proofs of absurdity associated with these paradoxes cannot be brought into normal form. The account combines epistemicism about truth with a proof-theoretic diagnosis of paradoxicality. The aim is to combine a substantive philosophical account of truth with a more rigorous and technical diagnosis of the source of paradox for further consideration by logicians. Core Logic plays a central role in the account on offer. It is shown that the account is not prey to the problem of revenge paradox.