Not knowing you know: : a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge

• Autores: John N. Williams
• Localización: Analysis, ISSN-e 1467-8284, Vol. 75, Nº. 2, 2015, págs. 213-217
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Foley (2012: 93�98) and Turri (2012: 215�19) have recently given objections to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objection of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection relates to rival theories and how this might be a worry for some of these.

    What might be called the early defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge may be formulated as follows. You know that p just in case you have a justified true belief that p and there is no defeater D of your justification for believing that p where This theory deals nicely with Gettier cases such Lamborghini, offered recently by Turri (2012: 215) and adapted as follows. Wishing to impress you, your student tells you that he owns a Lamborghini and affords you excellent evidence that does (he gives you a ride, tells you about the purchase, parks it in his garage and so on). Reasoning that he behaves just like a Lamborghini-owner, you believe on that basis that he owns one. Unbeknownst to you, he has promised to take care of his cousin�s Lamborghini while she is on a trip. But unbeknownst to you and him, she has died just after this promise, leaving him the Lamborghini in an unopened will.Most would agree that you have a justified belief that your student owns a Lamborghini that is luckily true and thus does not amount to knowledge. Because you justify that belief by inducing it from the truth that he behaves just like �