Yes: : Bare Particulars!

• Autores: Niall Connolly
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 172, Nº. 5, 2015, págs. 1355-1370
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • What is the Bare Particular Theory? Is it committed, like the Bundle Theory, to a constituent ontology: according to which a substance’s qualities—and according to the Bare Particular Theory, its substratum also—are proper parts of the substance? I argue that Bare Particularists need not, should not, and—if a recent objection to ‘the Bare Particular Theory’ (Andrew Bailey’s ‘New Objection’) succeeds—cannot endorse a constituent ontology. There is nothing, I show, in the motivations for Bare Particularism or the principles that distinguish Bare Particularism from rival views that entails a constituent ontology. I outline a version of Bare Particularism that in rejecting a constituent ontology avoids the New Objection. I argue against Theodore Sider that this really is a distinct theory to the version of Bare Particularism that endorses a constituent ontology, and not a mere terminological variant. I show that this, the best version of the Bare Particular Theory, is also defensible against the old objections.