The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament

• Mukherjee, Arijit ^[2] ; Wang, Leonard F.S. ^[1]
  1. [1] National University of Kaohsiung

     National University of Kaohsiung

     Taiwán

     
  2. [2] University of Nottingham and The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy, UK, and CESifo, Germany
• Localización: Journal of Technology Management & Innovation, ISSN-e 0718-2724, Vol. 6, Nº. 4, 2011, págs. 73-79
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from excessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy.