Shaftesbury’s place in the history of moral realism

• Autores: T.H. Irwin
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 172, Nº. 4, 2015, págs. 865-882
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In contemporary moral philosophy ‘moral realism’ refers to a position in the metaphysics of morality that is analogous to realism about ordinary objects, and to scientific realism about theoretical entities. It is a realist doctrine in contrast to non-cognitivism, constructivism, fictionalism, and nihilism about moral judgments and moral properties. But while these particular contrasts are characteristic of contemporary philosophy, realism itself is much older. Ross, Prichard, and Sidgwick, for instance, hold realist views in the metaphysics of morals, though they do not describe them in this way.

    As far as I know, the first person to use ‘moral realism’ as a description of a distinct tradition in modern moral philosophy is Whewell. He speaks of Shaftesbury as “the origin of a new school of real moralists” (1852, p. 91), who maintained some of the views of “the ancient school of Cudworth and Clarke”. Balguy is a member of this “old realist school” (p. 94) who defe ...