Traders vs. Relationship managers: : Reputational conflicts in full-service investment banks

• Autores: Zhaohui Chen, Alan D. Morrison, William J. Wilhelm Jr.
• Localización: Review of Financial Studies, ISSN-e 1465-7368, Vol. 28, Nº. 4, 2015, págs. 1153-1198
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest. Banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients' interest; on the other hand, banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so. A behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities. The model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks, as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral- and type-reputation concerns.