Competitive effects of exchanges or sales of airport landing slots

• Autores: James D. Reitzes, Brendan McVeigh, Nicholas Powers
• Localización: Review of Industrial Organization, ISSN-e 1573-7160, Vol. 46, Nº. 2, 2015, págs. 95-125
• Idioma: alemán
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • We investigate the competitive effects of exchanges or sales of airport landing slots, using a model where airlines allocate their slot endowments across routes consistent with a Cournot�Nash equilibrium. With symmetric endowments, an increase in the number of slot-holding airlines raises social welfare and consumer surplus. Under asymmetric slot endowments, larger slot holders serve �thin� demand routes that are not served by smaller slot holders. Transfers of slots from larger to smaller slot holders increase social welfare and consumer surplus; however, fewer routes may be served. These results may be reversed if airlines face substantial route-level fixed costs.