Choosing to comply with the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement. Factors leading to state compliance

• González Segovia, Octavio ^[1]
  1. [1] Hertie School of Governance

     Hertie School of Governance

     Berlin, Stadt, Alemania

     
• Localización: Revista CS, ISSN-e 2011-0324, Nº. 14, 2014 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Asia y América Latina), págs. 201-242
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • State compliance with international commitments is uneven. However, the perception of which countries will and will not comply and to what extent can be biased. Some scholars assume that the U.S. will abide by the India-U.S. 123 civil nuclear agreement, whose main objective is to supply India with nuclear fuel. Conversely, there is a perception that India will not honor its respective commitments (e.g. to maintain safeguard measures in its nuclear facilities). The present study contributes to expand the knowledge on the factors affecting compliance within the realm of nuclear trade by analyzing a non-binding instrument negotiated between two asymmetrical actors. Drawing on Peter Haas’ compliance theories, I analyzed the presence/relevance of international institutional and ideational factors which in combination with domestic politics and structures can influence the actor’s decision to comply. I found that we can expect India to more fully comply with the provisions of the treaty than the U.S. Depending on whether certain institutional or ideational factor intervenes; the U.S. is either not capable or unwilling to comply. Its will to comply could be affected inter alia by important domestic actors concerned with the application of the Hyde Act, as evidenced during the ratification process. Therefore, contrary to the mainstream view, the 123 Agreement neither enables India to achieve energy security nor ends thirty-four years of nuclear isolation.