Some ways that Theories on Customary International Law Fail: a reply to László Blutman

• Autores: Andrew T. Guzman, Jerome Hsiang
• Localización: European journal of international law = Journal europeen de droit international, ISSN 0938-5428, Vol. 25, Nº 2, 2014, págs. 553-559
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This brief comment seeks to clarify a foundational concept inherent in any discussion of customary international law (CIL): consent. Any serious attempt to construct a coherent theory of CIL must resolve the fundamental tension between non-consensual rulemaking and international law's formal commitment to the principle of consent. As a matter of observation, states rarely accept non-consensual laws or external norms as binding. Yet it is also undeniable that CIL serves and persists as a fundamental building block of international law. Therefore, in order to coherently theorize CIL, we must - at the very least - provide a plausible explanation for why rationally self-interested states would take CIL and other non-consensual laws seriously.